We Don't Have an American Way of War. We Have an American Way of Thinking.
Every unit training meeting is a theory of the next war.
That may sound dramatic, but think about the last time you sat through a quarterly training brief. Every decision, whether to prioritize maintenance over another field exercise, invest in drone training instead of another live-fire, or spend precious time rehearsing logistics rather than tactics, rests on an assumption about what future conflict will demand.
Most of us never say those assumptions out loud.
Instead, we inherit them.
For more than fifty years, military historians have debated whether the United States possesses a distinct "American Way of War." Russell Weigley's landmark work argued that Americans have historically preferred overwhelming force, industrial mobilization, and decisive battlefield victory. Others, including Antulio Echevarria, Colin Gray, Andrew Bacevich, and John Nagl, challenged, refined, or expanded that argument. Some insisted there is no single American way of war. Others argued that what truly exists is something deeper: an American strategic culture.
I believe that distinction matters.
We do not have one military strategy capable of winning every war. If history teaches us anything, it is that every conflict demands different operational approaches, political objectives, and military methods. The Civil War was not World War II. Vietnam was not Desert Storm. Iraq was not Afghanistan. Ukraine is not the Indo-Pacific.
Yet despite these differences, Americans consistently approach war with recognizable frames of mind. Those habits influence far more than battlefield tactics. They shape how we organize formations, allocate budgets, modernize equipment, conduct maintenance, educate leaders, and design training years before the first shot is fired.
Strategy changes.
Culture endures.
I think that is the real lesson from the American Way of War debate.
Military culture is not doctrine. It is the collection of assumptions that feel so obvious we rarely question them. Culturally, we believe several things to be true. Americans generally believe technological innovation provides an advantage. We value initiative over hesitation, logistics as a decisive enabler, and overwhelming combat power when national interests are fully committed. We tend to believe difficult military problems can be solved through organization, engineering, and superior resources.
None of these assumptions are inherently wrong.
But every assumption carries risk.
Vietnam exposed the limits of overwhelming firepower against political will. Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that tactical excellence does not automatically produce strategic success. Today, Ukraine reminds us that industrial capacity, sustainment, and attrition still matter in an age of precision weapons and artificial intelligence.
The challenge for today's leaders is not abandoning our strategic culture. It is recognizing where it creates blind spots.
Every commander is, in effect, placing bets on the future. Training calendars are investment portfolios. Maintenance plans reveal what equipment we expect to matter. Budget decisions expose our priorities. Professional military education reflects what we believe tomorrow's leaders must know.
The question is whether those bets are deliberate or inherited.
Young leaders do not need to solve the debate over the American Way of War. They need to understand that it exists. Once they recognize that their own assumptions shape readiness, they become better stewards of combat power.
Five Lessons for Today's Leaders
1. Train for adaptation, not prediction.
No one correctly predicts every future war. Build organizations capable of learning faster than the enemy rather than becoming experts in only one type of conflict.
2. Logistics is a warfighting system, not a support function.
Every major American victory has depended upon sustainment. Training logistics under contested conditions should receive the same attention as maneuver and fires.
3. Question inherited assumptions.
Ask why your unit trains the way it does. If the answer is simply, "because we've always done it this way," it deserves another look.
4. Balance technology with fundamentals.
Innovation matters. So does discipline, maintenance, physical readiness, leadership, and small-unit competence. Technology amplifies good organizations; it rarely rescues poor ones.
5. Build thinkers before specialists.
Doctrine changes. Equipment changes. Adversaries change. But leaders who understand military history, strategic culture, and the relationship between politics and war will adapt long after today's systems become obsolete.
The debate over the American Way of War has never really been about whether one historian was right or wrong. It is about becoming conscious of the assumptions that quietly shape our profession.
Every generation inherits a strategic culture.
The best leaders study it, challenge it, and refine it before the next war forces them to.
Because the most important question is not whether America has an "American Way of War."
It is whether we understand the way we think before that thinking determines how we fight.
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